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Abstract
This paper develops a model of directed-search where workers’ preference for
a higher wage is explicitly modelled into their application strategy. In a general
setting where jobs oﬀer non-uniform wages and diﬀerent probabilities of a job
oﬀer, the optimal strategy for selecting the set of applied jobs is established. In
applying this to a homogeneous-workers job-matching market, the equilibrium
outcome is then shown to entail wage dispersion when firms have non-uniform
labour demand. Finally a matching function is derived that captures both urn-
ball and multiple-applications frictions, that nests many of the existing functions.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates a search model combining two of the branches of search theory
that have received much attention recently, namely those of multiple-applications
matching and directed-search, to first investigate a matching process that incorporates
workers’ preference for a higher wage, and second to use the result to suggest a new
explanation for wage dispersion. Traditional matching functions are derived in an
urn-ball set-up where a matching market contains firms consisting of a single vacancy,
and workers each making a single application (e.g. Pissarides, 1979; Blanchard and
Diamond, 1994). However Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) point out that there
are two coordination frictions that operate simultaneously in a matching market: (1)
urn-ball friction, where some vacancies receive no application while others receive
more than one, and (2) multiple-applications friction, where some workers receive
multiple oﬀers while others receive none. The traditional models only capture the first.
On the other hand Julien, Kennes and King (2000), in which firms make a job oﬀer
to one worker after observing all applicants’ reservation wages, capture the second
but not the first. More recent models allow multiple-applications (e.g. Galenianos
and Kircher, 2005; Albrecht et al., 2006). Amongst them, Albrecht, Gautier, Tan and
Vroman (2004) and Hori (2007) both derive matching functions with workers making
multiple applications to firms consisting of a single vacancy. The model here builds
on the latter by allowing firms to advertise more than one vacancies, an extension
which leads to a result that uniform-wage cannot be an equilibrium outcome even
when workers are homogeneous.1 This is the first feature of the model in this paper.
The second feature is that it is a model of directed-search.2 Shi (2007) points
out three problems with undirected-search models: (1) in reality searching workers
do often have information about posted wages, (2) it has been a long tradition in
1Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) consider multiple-vacancies firms, but with single-application
workers. They conclude that with heterogeneous firms, frictions are more problematic when there
are more firms with limited number of vacancies. Hori (2005) also considers heterogeneous multiple-
vacancies firms, and derives an aggregate matching function that captures both the frictions caused
by co-ordination failure and heterogeneity.
2Examples of these include Montgomery (1991), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi and
Wright (2001), and more recently Galenianos and Kircher (2005) and Albrecht et al. (2006).
2
economics to treat prices as a useful mechanism to direct the allocation of resources
ex-ante, and (3) with undirected-search wage dispersion disappears if searching work-
ers can view the posted wages.3 In general in macroeconomic matching models the
equilibrium wage is determined as a result of bargaining ex-post of the match (e.g.
Pissarides, 2000). This paper follows those models that reinstate the traditional role
of wage as the ex-ante resource allocation tool and establish wage dispersion as the
equilibrium outcome. An earlier attempt at this was Moen (1997), in which the
labour market is divided into submarkets, each of which with an assigned exoge-
nously determined wage. Observing this workers choose a submarket to join, within
which matchings occur. Wage dispersion is then the result of a trade-oﬀ between
the wage level and the expected duration of unemployment period in the submarket.
Unfortunately with this set-up the matching mechanism itself, and therefore also the
matching function, are independent of the wage level within the submarkets. In this
paper the preference of the applicants for higher paying jobs is explicitly modelled
into the matching mechanism. In equilibrium when homogeneous workers all play
the same equilibrium strategy, the distribution of the wage levels aﬀect the resulting
application pattern of the workers. This in turn aﬀects two probabilities at a hiring
firm: for workers, the probability of a job oﬀer from the firm, and for the firm, the
probability of job acceptance when an oﬀer is made. A higher wage lowers the former
and raises the latter, which are the two trade-oﬀs that allow non-uniform wages. The
result attained here is that when firms’ labour demands are non-uniform, then the
wage oﬀers must also be non-uniform. This is because the diﬀerent number of job
vacancies advertised at firms aﬀect both of the probabilities above, which must then
be oﬀset by diﬀerent wage levels for the trade-oﬀs. Hence with a job-matching market
with multiple-vacancies firms, uniform-wage cannot be an equilibrium wage oﬀer even
when workers are homogeneous.
More specifically, the paper begins with a formal modelling of a wage-directed job
search, in a general set-up where each job is defined by its wage and its probability
3Some models allow firms to post wages but applicants do not know who posted which. For
examples of these see Burdett and Mortensen (1998) or Burdett and Coles (2003).
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of a job oﬀer. The wage is uniform to all workers, but the probability depends on
factors such as worker-job skills match, and hence is unique to an applicant. Once job
oﬀers are made, an applicant selects the job that pays the highest wage. The question
posed is then when multiple-applications is allowed, to which jobs, and to how many
of them, should a worker apply to. The problem is complicated by the fact that an
additional job application reduces the benefit of those jobs already applied to that
pay less wages, due to the reduced probability of accepting them (the ‘survival rate’)
if job oﬀers are received. By analyzing this survival rate, here the application strategy
that outlines the optimal selection process of the set of jobs to apply to is derived.
The rule is to always choose the Next Best Choice, defined as the job that yields the
highest marginal benefit from its addition to the set of already applied jobs, or the
one oﬀering the highest wage if there were more than one such. The optimal number
of job applications is then determined by the condition that the marginal benefit be
larger than the cost of application.
Once this wage-directed search mechanism for jobs is established, this is then
applied to the homogeneous-workers job-matching market to investigate the equilib-
rium outcome. By defining applicant types by the jobs to which workers apply to, the
workers’ problem becomes that of selecting a mixed-strategy of choosing the types. In
equilibrium all workers play the same mixed-strategy, which determines the probabil-
ity distribution of the applications patterns outcome (i.e. how many applications are
received at each job). Given these probabilities, in equilibrium workers are indiﬀerent
between the jobs, as a result of a trade-oﬀ between the wage level and the probability
of a job oﬀer, and the firms are indiﬀerent between diﬀerent wage levels that they can
oﬀer, a result of a trade-oﬀ between the wage level and the job acceptance probability.
The matching outcomes of both the uniform-wage and distinct-wages cases are ana-
lyzed, and it is shown that for heterogeneous job demands of the firms, wages must
also vary to establish the trade-oﬀs as already stated. Thus wage dispersion exists
in equilibrium despite workers being homogeneous. The matching function is then
derived for this multiple-applications, multiple-vacancies job matching market, that
captures both the urn-ball and the multiple-applications frictions. Most matching
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functions in the literature are nested in this derived function.
Similar results are obtained but for diﬀerent reasons by Galenianos and Kircher
(2005, 2007) who also consider wage-directed search. In their first model multiple-
applications workers view their applications as a portfolio choice problem, and are
thus willing to apply to jobs oﬀering diﬀerent wage levels (i.e. ‘risk-diversify’). This
incentivise firms to post diﬀerent wages. In equilibrium every worker applies once to
each distinct wage. In their second model wage dispersion is driven by fundamentals
where more productive firms post higher wages. However both of these assume single-
vacancy firms; here the multiple-vacancy element drives the wage dispersion result.
Some evidence of wage dispersion are surveyed in Mortensen (2003), where it is
estimated that “observable worker characteristics that are supposed to account for
productivity diﬀerences typically explain no more than 30 percent of the variation in
compensation across workers” (p.1). Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) also state
that factors related to human capital theory, the theory of compensating diﬀerentials
and the models of discrimination (see Hornstein et al. for explanations of these) ex-
plain at most one third of the total wage variation. Diﬀerent explanations are oﬀered
in the literature for the remaining wage variation (sometimes termed as the ‘frictional
wage dispersion’ (Hornstein et al., 2006)); some rely on productivity heterogeneity of
the firms (Montgomery, 1991; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000; Galenianos and Kircher,
2007), while others on the reservation wage heterogeneity of the workers (Albrecht
and Axell, 1984). Those assuming homogeneous firms and workers rely on asymmet-
ric information, with workers having only partial information regarding wages oﬀered
by firms (Burdett and Judd, 1983; Mortensen, 2003). This paper adds to this list an
alternative explanation.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 establishes the optimal job applica-
tion strategy. Section 3 then investigates the equilibrium wage oﬀers in a homogeneous-
workers job-matching market. Section 4 derives the matching function and compares
it with existing functions in the literature. Section 5 then .
5
2 Job Application Strategy
2.1 The Labour Market
Consider a job-matching market where firms oﬀer one or more vacancies for each
advertised job, and workers apply to one or more vacancies. In this paper I distinguish
between a job and a vacancy: a job is defined by its characteristics, and consists of
one or more of its vacancies. The job characteristics are factors such as its job
specification, the wage level and the number of vacancies. In line with reality, it is
assumed that workers can only apply once to a particular job, irrespective of the
labour demand at that job.
The job-matching market operates in the following manner:
1. Firms j = 1, ..., J determine the characteristics of the jobs, including the wage
level wj and the number of vacancies Lj , and advertise. Each firm’s wage oﬀer
is the same for all applicants.
2. Workers i = 1, ..., I view the advertised jobs and their characteristics, and each
worker estimates his probability pij of receiving a job oﬀer from job j, which
depends on the degree of his match to the job’s specification, as well as the
popularity of the job by other candidates. The workers then each select an
optimal set of jobs to apply to, and apply.
3. Firms with more than one applications per vacancy select one candidate for
each vacancy and make a job oﬀer.
4. Applicants with one or more job oﬀers accept one job of their highest preference.
5. Applicants with no job oﬀer remain unemployed. Vacancies with no application,
or with a selected candidate who rejects its job oﬀer, remain unfilled.
I assume no post-match wage renegotiation. Also in this section no assumptions
are made about the probabilities of a job oﬀer pij . Hence for example a possibility
of a better paying job oﬀering a higher probability of successful application is not
ruled out. For now I take these probabilities to be given. The labour demand at each
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job L = (L1, ..., LJ) is also assumed given exogenously; the situation envisaged is one
where firms are replacing a random number of lost workers. L, as well as the wage
vector w = (w1, ..., wJ), are known by all parties. Applications are on the other hand
private in that the application pattern of a worker is only known by the applicant
himself, and the number of received applications at each firm is only known by the
firm.
Now let the set of available jobs be denoted by Ω = {1, 2, ..., J}. The set of
applied jobs for worker i is a subset Ai ⊂ Ω. The investigation in this section is
to formally model the mapping from Ω to Ai, which is the optimal job application
strategy. Without loss of generality then, let jobs be numbered in the descending
order of their wage levels w1 ≥ w2 ≥ ... ≥ wJ . Jobs oﬀering the same wage level
are ordered, for a particular worker, in the descending order of their associated job
oﬀer probabilities. Identical jobs (i.e. those with the same wage level and the same
probability) are ordered randomly between them. The ordering is therefore unique to
a worker. In this analysis I focus on a representative applicant i, and for notational
brevity the subscript i is suppressed for the rest of this section. Now given the set
Ω of jobs ordered as described above, again without loss of generality the following
assumptions are made regarding a worker’s preference between the jobs. First in
choosing jobs to apply to, when an applicant has a choice between two or more jobs
with identical preferences, then he will always choose the one furthest to the left (i.e.
the smallest numbered). Second once jobs are oﬀered, the worker will always prefer
the one with the highest wage. If he receives more than one job oﬀers with the same
wage, then again the applicant chooses the one assigned with the smallest number.
For simplification it is assumed that workers’ utility from a matched job is solely
monetary, although this can easily be modified. Therefore once an applicant is
matched with job j, his benefit before cost is the wage income wj . In a more general
framework this may be the discounted present value of the expected life-time benefit.
As the purpose here is to establish the optimal job application strategy, the static
one-period model of jobs is adopted. The cost of application is assumed to be uniform
at c. The expected net benefit from a worker’s first application, to say job j, is then
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pjwj− c. For his second application, this time to job k, the total expected net benefit
from the two applications is either pjwj+(1−pj)pkwk−2c or pkwk+(1−pk)pjwj−2c,
depending on whether job k is to the right or to the left of j in the numbering system.
The applicant’s objective is then to choose the optimal set A∗ of a∗ applied jobs, with
its corresponding set of wages W ∗, that maximizes the following total expected net
benefit,
max
A⊂Ω
Ew(A)− ac
where Ew(A) =
X
j∈A
s(A<j)pjwj (1)
and s(A<j) =
Y
k∈A,k<j
(1− pk)
Here A<j denotes the subset {k ∈ A| k < j} of the set A of chosen a jobs, and s(A<j)
is the survival rate for job j, i.e. the probability that, if oﬀered, the worker will accept
job j. Ew(A) is then the expected wage income from applying to set A of chosen
jobs. The worker would only apply to another job, say l, if the marginal increase in
the expected wage income Ewl(A0) of forming a new set A0 is strictly greater than c,
where Ewl(A0) is given by,
Ewl(A0) = s(A0<l)
⎡
⎣plwl − pl
X
j∈A0,j>l
s(A0(l,j))pjwj
⎤
⎦
= s(A0<l)
h
Ew({l})− plEw(A0>l)
i
(2)
where A0(l,j) denotes the set {k ∈ A0| l < k < j}. Adding a new job to a set of
already applied jobs therefore has two opposing eﬀects: a positive eﬀect of increasing
the expected income by its own contribution s(A0<l)Ew({l}), and a negative eﬀect
of reducing the contribution of those jobs on the right of it by a factor pl. The
condition Ewl(A0) > c then determines the number of applications a. Note however
that diﬀerent sequences of chosen jobs may lead to diﬀerent stopping points; the
challenge is to find the optimal set of jobs A∗ with its corresponding optimal a∗.
To demonstrate this problem, consider the following example of a set of available
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jobs, with their corresponding wage levels and the probabilities of a job oﬀer:
j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
wj 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
pj 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.49 0.50 0.95 0.90
pjwj 13.0 10.8 20.0 16.8 12.0 12.5 19.6 15.0 19.0 9.0
< Table 1: Example of Wages and Job Oﬀer Probabilities >
The last row shows the expected wage income Ew({j}) = pjwj from applying to the
job on its own. As shown this is the highest for job 3. So consider the case that the
worker first applies to job 3. Contemplate further the case that the applicant uses a
strategy whereby he selects the next job to apply to that yields the largest marginal
increase in the expected wage income using (2). This in this case turns out to be job
7, for which Ew7({3, 7}) = (1− p3)×Ew({7}) = 14.7. Now instead consider the case
where the worker first applies to job 4. Then the job with the largest Ewj({4, j}) is
this time job 3, for which Ew3({3, 4}) = 15.8. Therefore if the cost of application
c was 15.0, then in the first case the applicant would stop applying after the first
job, while in the second case he would continue applying to the second. However the
worker in this example is in fact better oﬀ in the first case, as the expected net benefits
are 20.0− 15.0 = 5.0 and 16.8 + 15.8− 15.0× 2 = 2.6 respectively. It turns out that
this strategy of always adding the next job with the highest marginal contribution,
as long as it is above the cost of application, is the optimal job application strategy,
with its optimal number of applied jobs a∗. For example then for c = 9, the optimal
set of applied jobs is A∗ = {3, 4, 7}, with a∗ = 3.4
2.2 Optimal Job Application Strategy
To prove the optimal job application strategy it is first useful to note the following
mathematical property of Ew(.),
4 It is therefore not optimal for example to apply to the job with the highest individual expected
wage income Ew({j}). In this case job 9 is not in A∗, despite Ew({9}) being larger than Ew({4}).
9
Property 1 Given w1 ≥ w2 ≥ ... ≥ wn for jobs j = 1, ..., n in the set of n applied
jobs An ⊂ Ω,
Ew(An) ≤ w1
This property is intuitive: the best an applicant can do is to be oﬀered the highest
paying job for sure.5 Using this I first show the following,
Proposition 1 Given jobs oﬀering the same wage level, the applicant will always
choose to apply to the left-most job.
This is true by assumption for the case that the jobs have the identical probability
of a job oﬀer. When they do not, then the job with the highest probability, say job
k, would be on the furthest left. It is not immediately obvious that k would be the
best choice of job to apply to, due to its larger negative eﬀect on the jobs j ∈ A>k to
the right of job k in the set of applied jobs A (i.e. the second term in (2)). This is
checked in the following proof,
Proof. Consider two jobs k and k+1, with wk = wk+1 but pk > pk+1. The mar-
ginal increases in the expected wage income of adding each of these jobs to the set A of
already applied jobs are, using (2), Ewk(A∪{k}) = s(A<k)
£
Ew({k})− pkEw(A>k+1)
¤
and Ewk+1(A ∪ {k + 1}) = s(A<k)
£
Ew({k + 1})− pk+1Ew(A>k+1)
¤
respectively.
Substituting Ew({k}) = pkwk and Ew({k + 1}) = pk+1wk the diﬀerence is,
Ewk(A ∪ {k})−Ewk+1(A ∪ {k + 1}) = s(A<k)(pk − pk+1)
n
wk −Ew(A>k+1)
o
which is non-negative using Property 1. Hence k is weakly preferred to k+1, and the
applicant will choose the left-most job k.
5Mathematically, for example for n = 3,
Ew(A3) = p1w1 + (1− p1)p2w2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)p3w3
≤ {p1 + (1− p1)p2 + (1− p1)(1− p2)p3}w1
≤ [p1 + (1− p1) {p2 + (1− p2)}]w1
= w1
This is true for all n ≥ 1.
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I can now investigate the optimal set of applied jobs A∗. First define the following,
Definition 1 (Best Choice) Given a set of advertised jobs Ω, with the correspond-
ing set of wages W , the Best Choice job for an applicant is b1 ∈ Ω such that,
1. pb1wb1 ≥ pjwj ∀j ∈ Ω, and
2. b1 < j ∀j such that pb1wb1 = pjwj.
Then,
Proposition 2 b1 ∈ A∗.
Proof. Suppose not. Then from Proposition 1 the set A∗ cannot contain any jobs
oﬀering the same wage as b1. Consider then the following two cases:
1. b1 < max{A∗}, i.e. ∃ r ∈ A∗ with corresponding wage wr that is the next
largest in W ∗. Thus wb1 > wr. Now compare two sets A
∗ and A0, the latter
of which is formed by replacing r in A∗ with b1. The expected wage income of
each set can be expanded as,
Ew(A∗) = Ew(A∗<r) + s(A∗<r)Ew({r}) + s(A∗<r)(1− pr)Ew(A∗>r)
Ew(A0) = Ew(A0<b1) + s(A0<b1)Ew({b1}) + s(A0<b1)(1− pb1)Ew(A0>b1)
Then, as subsets A0<b1 = A∗<r and A0>b1 = A∗>r,
Ew(A0)−Ew(A∗) = s(A0<b1)
n
Ew({b1})−Ew({r})− (pb1 − pr)Ew(A0>b1)
o
(3)
By the definition of b1, Ew({b1}) ≥ Ew({r}). For the case that pb1 < pr then,
this is clearly strictly positive. For the case pb1 > pr,
Ew({b1})−Ew({r}) = pb1wb1 − prwr > (pb1 − pr)wr ≥ (pb1 − pr)Ew(A0>b1)
The last inequality uses Property 1. Hence (3) is again strictly positive. Finally
for pb1 = pr, wb1 > wr implies that Ew({b1}) > Ew({r}) strictly, and hence
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once again (3) is strictly positive. Thus Ew(A0) > Ew(A∗), and A∗ cannot be
the optimal set.
2. b1 > max{A∗}, i.e. wb1 < wj (again strictly) ∀wj ∈W ∗. Let then max{A} = r.
This time, where A0 is again formed by replacing r in A∗ with b1,
Ew(A∗) = Ew(A∗<r) + s(A∗<r)Ew({r})
Ew(A0) = Ew(A0<b1) + s(A0<b1)Ew({b1})
As again A0<b1 = A∗<r the only term that is aﬀected is Ew({b1}). This is strictly
greater than Ew({r}), as by the definition of b1 no jobs with equal Ew({.}) can
be on the left of b1. Hence again Ew(A0) > Ew(A∗) and A∗ cannot be the
optimal set.
Thus we now know that in Table 1, b1 = 3 must be in the final set of applied jobs
A∗. The next question is then how to select the rest of the jobs in A∗. To investigate
this I now define the following,
Definition 2 (Next Best Choice) Given a set of chosen jobs {j, k, l, ...}, the next
best choice (NBC) β(j, k, l, ...) of jobs {j, k, l, ...} is defined by following properties,
1. Ew({β(j, ...), j, k, l, ...}) ≥ Ew({m, j, k, l, ...}) ∀m ∈ Ω| {j, k, l, ...}, and
2. β(j, k, l, ...) < m ∀m such that Ew({β(j, ...), j, k, l, ...}) = Ew({m, j, k, l, ...}).
I denote the set of the series of N NBCs BN = {b1, b2, ..., bN}, where b2 = β(b1),
b3 = β(b1, b2), ... , bN = β(b1, b2, ..., bN−1). Then,
Proposition 3 (Optimal Job Application Strategy) The optimal set of jobs to
apply to is found by adding each time the NBC bj+1 to the already chosen set Bj.
Then A∗ = Ba∗, where Ewba∗ (Ba∗) > c and Ewba∗+1(Ba∗+1) ≤ c.
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With the example in Table 1, it can be checked that b2 = β(3) = 7 and b3 =
β(3, 7) = 4, and hence the proposition predicts that when c = 9, the optimal set A∗ is
B3 = {3, 4, 7}. The proof that follows is in two stages. First it is shown that for any
given N ≥ 1, the NBC set BN is the expected wage maximising (hereafter Ew-max)
set of all sets of N applied jobs {AN}. In the second stage it is shown that Ba with
its optimal stopping point a is the optimal set A∗ of all possible sets of applied jobs
{An}, 1 ≤ n ≤ J .
Proof. First I prove by contradiction that, given all possible sets of N applied
jobs {AN}, the set of NBCs BN ⊂ {AN} yields the highest expected wage income
Ew(AN). So suppose not, and assume that there exists a set A∗N not equal to BN ,
which is the Ew-max set of {AN}. Now without loss of generality, assume that A∗N
contains the n first NBCs Bn = {b1, ..., bn} where n < N . Appendix A shows, in a
proof analogous to that for Proposition 2 above, that if an element r ∈ A∗N |Bn is
selected and replaced with bn+1 using the rule outlined in the appendix, then the new
set A0N yields higher expected wage income Ew(A
0
N ) than Ew(A
∗
N). Therefore A
∗
N
cannot be the Ew-max set. This is true for all n = 1, ..., N − 1, and hence the set of
N NBCs BN is the Ew-max set of N applied jobs A∗N . So it remains to show that Ba
such that Ewba(Ba) > c but Ewba+1(Ba+1) ≤ c is the optimal set A∗ of all possible
sets {An}, 1 ≤ n ≤ J , i.e. a = a∗. Consider then any other set of applied jobs Aa0 with
its optimal stopping point a0. As Ew(Ba0) > Ew(Aa0) and a is the optimal stopping
point of {Bn}, n ≥ 1, it follows that Ew(Ba∗)−a∗c ≥ Ew(Ba0)−a0c > Ew(Aa0)−a0c,
∀a0. Hence Aa0 cannot be the optimal set of applied jobs, and thus A∗ = Ba with the
optimal stopping point a∗ = a.
I have therefore established the optimal application strategy for an individual
worker for the general case. This can now be applied to investigate the labour market
equilibrium outcome. In the next section I do this for the case of homogeneous
workers. This allows me to derive the multiple-applications matching function that
is comparable to those in the literature, which follows in Section 4.
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3 Homogeneous Workers Labour Market
First I investigate the equilibrium application strategy of the applicants.
3.1 Equilibrium Applications
Up till now the probability pij of a job oﬀer at job j was unique to worker i, depending
partly on the suitability of the worker to the job specification. With homogeneous
workers the probability pj is the same for all i, and it now depends purely on the
number of applications received by j, denoted αj . The optimal number of applications
for each applicant is also now the same, and is from here on treated given as a. Wages
are for now assumed to be given and distinct; an argument for non-degenerate wage
distribution is given later in this section.
Given uniform a then, the problem of individual worker choosing his set of applied
jobs A becomes simplified to that of choosing an applicant type t ∈ {1, ..., τ}, where
each t is represented by the distinct permutation of selecting a jobs out of J . The
number of possible types is τ =
¡J
a
¢
. The applicant types can be represented by a
J × τ type matrix T, where Tjt = 1 if type t applies to job j, and is 0 otherwise. For
example for J = 4 and a = 2, there are
¡4
2
¢
= 6 possible applicant types,
T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(4)
In this case a type 1 applicant applies to the first two jobs. If now the number of each
type chosen by the workers is given by a τ×1 vector n = (n1, ..., nτ )0, then the resulting
number of applicants at each job is given by a J×1 vector α(n) = (α1(n), ..., αJ(n))0
calculated by
Tn = α(n) (5)
By assumption firms do not know the types chosen by the workers, and hence neither
the resulting applications pattern n. Given the number of workers I and the number
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of types τ , the number of possible outcomes of n is given by
¡I+τ−1
I
¢
.6 Denote the
set of all such possible realizations n by Λ. Given a realized applications outcome
α(n), n ∈ Λ, firms with more applications than its number of vacancies choose their
candidates randomly. The workers’ probability of a job oﬀer from firm j when the
realized application pattern is n is therefore,
pj(n) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
min
h
Lj
αj(n)
, 1
i
, if αj(n) > 0
0 , if αj(n) = 0
(6)
Using the result from Section 2, it is now possible to state the following regarding the
equilibrium strategy of the applicants,
Equilibrium Applications Assuming that a < J and the cost of advertising a
vacancy is non-zero, the equilibrium strategy of the applicants is given by a
mixed-strategy θ = (θ1, ..., θτ )0 of selecting type t, such that θ solves, for an
equilibrium constant λ,
1
Φj (θ)
E [pj(n)wj ] = λ ∀j ∈ Ω such that θ ≥ 0 and
τX
t=1
θt = 1 (7)
where the expectation operator E[X(n)] =
P
n∈Λ φn (θ)X(n) takes the average
over all possible realizations of n ∈ Λ with the probability density function
φn (θ), which for given θ is given by,
φn (θ) =
I!Qτ
t=1 nt!
τY
t=1
θntt (8)
and Φj (θ) is the probability that job j receives at least one application,
Φj (θ) =
X
{n0∈Λ|αj(n0)>0}
φn0 (θ) (9)
Thus in equilibrium the expected wage incomes from all jobs, averaged over all
outcomes of n for which the jobs receive at least one application, equate. Intuitively
6This can be proved by induction.
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(7) formulates the trade-oﬀ between higher wage and lower probability of a job oﬀer.
In equilibrium then applicants are indiﬀerent between all jobs. The level of λ is
determined by the relative bargaining power between the firms and the workers.
Proof. Consider first the case where there is an upward deviation 1Φk(θ)E [pkwk] >
λ for some k ∈ Λ. Then job k would be the Best Choice job as defined in Definition 1,
and hence by Proposition 2 it will be in all applicants’ set of applied jobs. This would
drive 1Φk(θ)E [pkwk] back down to λ, which is ensured by the fact that it is not in the
interest of the firm to oﬀer a wage level any higher than the level at which the equality
occurs. On the other hand if there is a downward deviation 1Φk(θ)E [pkwk] < λ, then
this time all jobs apart from k are the Best Choice for all applicants, which means
that for a < J job k would receive no application. With a non-zero cost of vacancies
firms will avoid this outcome by raising wk such that 1Φk(θ)E [pkwk] = λ. Thus in
equilibrium (7) holds. φn(θ) given in (8) is then the probability that the applications
pattern is n, given the application strategy θ.
3.2 Wages
Consider now the firms. Firm j’s expected profit per vacancy is given by,7
Eπj =
mj
Lj
(y − wj) (10)
where y is the uniform productivity of the workers, and mj is the expected number
of filled vacancies, which is a function of the wages and the labour demand at all
firms (w,L), as well as the number of applicants I and the number of applications
per applicant, a. This number of matches at each firm is now investigated separately
for the two cases where firms either oﬀer uniform or distinct wages. First take the
case of the uniform wages wj = w ∀j ∈ Ω,
7The cost of maintaining vacancies is now ignored.
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Uniform-Wages Match Under uniform wages, the number of matches at firm j is,
mUj (I,L, w, a) = E
"
τX
t=1
qjt(n)Tjtntpj(n)
#
(11)
where given realization n, qjt(n) is the probability that type t accepts the job
oﬀer from j given that t applies to j,
qjt(n) =
a−1X
i=0
(−1)i
(i+ 1)!
JX
k=1,k 6=j
...
JX
r=1,r 6=j,k,l,...
Tktpk(n)...Trtpr(n)| {z }
i summations
(12)
and pj(n) is the probability of a job oﬀer given by (6).
Proof. By symmetry type t worker who applies to j would accepts j’s oﬀer
with probability 1i+1 if the worker has i other oﬀers. Then for a realized applications
pattern n the probability of job acceptance by type t is given by,
qjt(n) =
a−1X
i=0
1
(i+ 1)!
JX
k=1,k 6=j
...
JX
r=1,r 6=j,k,l,...
Tktpk(n)...Trtpr(n)| {z }
i summations
JY
s=1,s6=j,...,r
(1− Tstps(n))| {z }
J−1−i product sums
(13)
For example when i = 1, the worker receives 1 other job oﬀer apart from j, and the
probability of job acceptance is 12!
PJ
k=1,k 6=j Tktpk(n)
QJ
s=1,s6=j,k (1− Tstps(n)). The
term 1(i+1)! reflects the i! symmetries in the i-summations as well as the
1
i+1 probability
of job acceptance. This is summed over all possible numbers of job oﬀers i, the
maximum number of which is a− 1, to yield (13). Expanding the product-sum terms
in (13) and collecting the terms for each i-summation yields (12). The expected
number of matches at firm j for a given realized applications pattern n is then,
mUnj =
⎧
⎨
⎩
Pτ
t=1 qjt(n)
Tjtnt
αj(n)
min (Lj , αj(n)) , if αj(n) > 0
0 , if αj(n) = 0
=
τX
t=1
qjt(n)Tjtntpj(n) (14)
17
where Tjtntαj(n) is the probability of each type being chosen (note
Pτ
t=1 Tjtnt = αj(n))
and min (Lj , αj(n)) is the number of job oﬀers made, taking into account that if the
firm receives less applications than its number of vacancies then it can only oﬀer
αj(n) jobs. The second line then uses (6). The overall number of matches is then the
expectation of this evaluated over all possible realizations of n.
Next consider the case when firms oﬀer non-uniform wages. For simplicity I as-
sume that the oﬀered wage levels are distinct. As before firms are numbered in the
decreasing order of their wage levels, and given two or more job oﬀers workers accept
the highest paying (i.e. the lowest numbered) job. Then this time,
Distinct-Wages Match With distinct wages the number of matches at firm j is,
mDj (I,L,w, a) = E
"
τX
t=1
sjt(n)Tjtntpj(n)
#
(15)
where for realization n, sjt is the survival rate that a candidate of type t would
not receive any job oﬀers from firms oﬀering higher wages, given that t applies
to j,
sjt(n)=
j−1Y
k=1
(1− Tktpk(n)) (16)
For example in the example (4), for firm 3 represented by row 3, the chosen
candidate may be of the types 2, 4 or 6. For types 2 and 4 the candidate’s acceptance
depends on whether he has also been oﬀered a job by firms 1 or 2, while for type 6
applicant s36 = 1. If the worker survives all j − 1 firms (i.e. does not receive any job
oﬀers from these firms), then he will always accept the oﬀer from j with probability
1. The number of matches is then given by replacing the job acceptance probability
qjt(n) for the uniform-wages case in (11), with this survival rate (16).
Note that the number of matches in both (11) and (15) reflect the probability of
job acceptance, as well as the possible number of applications received. This contrasts
with the matching models in literature that generally only consider the latter. The
matching model here therefore captures both the urn-ball friction and the multiple-
applications friction, as defined by Albrecht et al. (2006).
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3.3 Wage Dispersion Equilibrium
Now the equilibrium wage oﬀer can be investigated. First I define the equilibrium,
Equilibrium Wage Oﬀer Given L the equilibrium wage oﬀer w is one that satis-
fies,
Eπj =
mj
Lj
(y − wj) = π ∀j = 1, ..., J (17)
for an equilibrium constant π, where mj is the number of matches at firm j
for the wage oﬀer w, given that the workers play the equilibrium application
strategy ( 7).
This simply states that the expected profit from each vacancy is the same for
all firms, if the applicants all play the equilibrium strategy. This is the second of
the two trade-oﬀs, namely that of between higher wage and lower probability of job
acceptance. Again the level of π is determined by the relative bargaining power
between the firms and the workers. Then,
Proposition 4 For non-uniform L, uniform wages w cannot be an equilibrium out-
come.
Proof. For uniform wages wj = w, (7) implies that workers choose their equilib-
rium application strategy θ such that the resulting probability distribution φn (θ) for
n ∈ Λ satisfies 1Φj(θ)E [pj(n)] =
λ
w ∀j = 1, ..., J , for the equilibrium constant λ. How-
ever for non-uniform L, for this probability distribution the resulting
mUj
Lj
evaluated
using (11) are non-uniform. Therefore (17) cannot hold for wj = w.
In fact the relative sizes of Lj has opposing eﬀects on
mUj
Lj
and consequently on
the sizes of Eπj :
1. While a larger Lj for firm j does not aﬀect the firm’s own job acceptance
probabilities qjt(n) given realizations n, it does reduce qkt(n) at other firms k 6=
j for which Tkt = 1, i.e.
∂qkt(n)
∂Lj
< 0 in (12). This is a benefit of being a bigger
player in the labour market: for Lj > Lk, on average there are proportionally
more applicants at k with firm j’s oﬀer than those with k’s oﬀer at firm j.
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2. For (7) to hold, changes in Lj also aﬀect the probabilities of the realizations of
n. More specifically, an increase in Lj leads to an adjustment in the workers’
equilibrium application strategy θ such that φn (θ) is higher for the realizations
n for which αj(n) is higher. This has two opposing eﬀects on Eπj . Firstly it
increases the per vacancy profit by reducing the probabilities of outcomes for
which αj(n) = 0. Secondly given that firm j receives one or more applications,
an increase in Lj reduces Eπj by increasing the probabilities of n for which
αk(n), k 6= j, is lower, i.e. qjt(n) is lower. Intuitively this is an eﬀect where,
given the fixed number of applications a, more applications at j means less
applications at elsewhere, which implies a higher probability of the applicants
at j having job oﬀers from rival firms.
These eﬀects do not in general oﬀset each other, leading to non-uniform Eπ, and
hence uniform wages cannot be an equilibrium outcome when L is non-uniform. The
point is that when the number of vacancies at the firms are non-uniform, the eﬀects of
this on the probability pj(n) of a job oﬀer and the probability
mj
Lj
of a job acceptance
must be oﬀset by non-uniform wages for the two trade-oﬀs in (7) and (17) to be
re-established. Note however that when firms are totally homogeneous, in that the
labour demands Lj are the same as well as the wage oﬀers wj , then by symmetry
the equilibrium application strategy for homogeneous workers is to choose the type
randomly,
θH=
µ
1
τ
,
1
τ
, ...,
1
τ
¶0
(18)
In this case on average all firms receive an equal number of applications,
EαH =
µ
aI
J
,
aI
J
, ...,
aI
J
¶0
(19)
which leads to uniform Eπ. Hence the uniform wage oﬀers wH can be an equilibrium
when firms have uniform labour demand.
It still remains to show that there is an unambiguous trade-oﬀ between higher
wages and higher matching ratio
mDj
Lj
, for the trade-oﬀ in (17). The eﬀect of wj on
mDj is again a combination of opposing factors,
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1. Given realizations n, the job acceptance probabilities sjt(n) are higher when
the firm moves up the rank by increasing wj ,
sj−1t(n) =
sjt(n)
1− Tj−1tpj−1(n)
> sjt(n)
This is a discontinuous eﬀect that occurs whenever the ranking is altered.
2. As with the uniform wage case, the probabilities φn (θ) are aﬀected in a way
that it both reduces the probability of no applications αj(n) = 0 (i.e. a positive
eﬀect on
mDj
Lj
) and increases the probabilities of the realizations n for which
sjt(n) is lower (i.e. a negative eﬀect on
mDj
Lj
).
The step function nature of the first eﬀect however ensures that there is an un-
ambiguous trade-oﬀ. When a firm increases its wage oﬀer by a small amount, both
eﬀects in the second point above are small. However if the wage increase results in
the firm moving up the rank then the positive eﬀect on mDj , and hence on Eπj , will
be non-insignificant. Hence at this point the sign of
∂mDj
∂wj
is unambiguously positive,
allowing a trade-oﬀ between higher wage payout and higher match.
3.4 Illustration: Case (J, I, a) = (3, 3, 2)
Consider the case (J, I, a) = (3, 3, 2). The type matrix is
T =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
Let the labour demand at the three firms be L = (1, 1, 2)0. Consider first the case of
uniform-wage. The equilibrium application strategy θ that satisfy (7) is calculated to
be θU=(0.02, 0.49, 0.49)0, reflecting the fact that the applicants would choose types
2 and 3, who apply to the firm oﬀering 2 vacancies, with higher probabilities than
type 1. These randomization probabilities determine the probability of each of the¡3+3−1
3
¢
= 10 possible realizations of n ∈ Λ, given by (8). The realization probabilities
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are, in turn, used to average over the number of matches mUnj given in (14), yielding
the expected matches (11) ofmU = (0.59, 0.59, 1.43)0 with the corresponding expected
profits per vacancy of Eπ = (0.26, 0.26, 0.32)0. These are non-uniform as predicted,
and therefore the uniform wages are not the equilibrium wage oﬀer.
Next consider the non-uniform wage oﬀer w = (1.00, 0.95, 0.75)0, with as before
firm 3 oﬀering the 2 vacancies. The equilibrium application strategy is this time
θD = (0.18, 0.43, 0.39)0, indicating a shift in the application intension of the workers
towards jobs oﬀering higher wages compared with θU . The resulting expected matches
(15), calculated by evaluating the survival rates (16) for each t and each n, is mD =
(0.94, 0.79, 0.94)0, or the matching rates
mDj
Lj
are (0.94, 0.79, 0.47)0. Then if the worker
productivity was y = 1.25, the expected per vacancy profits are uniform at Eπj = 0.24
∀j, implying that this is an equilibrium wage oﬀer for the given values of L and y.
4 Application: Matching Function
One application of the results obtained in Section 3 is to derive the aggregate matching
function for the homogeneous workers labour market that is comparable to those in
the literature. A matching function is an aggregate macroeconomic function that gives
the number of matches m given the number of the unemployed U and the number
of vacancies V . The function m =M(U, V ) and its properties are generally assumed
in the macroeconomic literature. In the above model of wage-directed match with
multiple applications and multiple vacancies, where U = I and V =
PJ
j=1 Lj , the
expected number of matches when wage oﬀers are either uniform or distinct are, for
given I, L, w and a,
mX(I,L,w; a) =
JX
j=1
mXj (I,L,w, a) , X ∈ {U,D} (20)
where mXj are given by (11) and (15) for the cases X ∈ {U,D}. There is however an
alternative derivation for the matching function, which uses the fact that as firms can
only make one oﬀer per vacancy, an applicant with at least one job oﬀer is guaranteed
a job. Then,
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Aggregate Matching Function The number of matches when all workers adopt
the equilibrium application strategy θ is,
m(I,L,w; a) = I (1−Ψ(I,L,w; a)) (21)
where Ψ(I, L,w; a) is the probability that a worker receives zero job oﬀer from
all his job applications,
Ψ(I,L,w; a) = E
⎡
⎣
τX
t=1
nt
I
JY
j=1
(1− Tjtpj(n))
⎤
⎦ (22)
Here
QJ
j=1 (1− Tjtpj(n)) is the probability of type t not getting a single job oﬀer
for the given realization n. Averaging this over t and over n ∈ Λ gives the expected
probability of no job oﬀer for an applicant. Now,
Proposition 5 (20) and (21) are equivalent for both uniform and distinct wage of-
fers.
Proof. First consider the uniform wage job acceptance probabilities qjt in (12),
JX
j=1
qjtTjtpj(n) =
aX
i=1
(−1)i−1
i!
JX
j=1
JX
k=1,k 6=j
...
JX
r=1,r 6=j,k,l,...
Tjtpj(n)...Trtpr(n)| {z }
i summations
= 1−
JY
j=1
(1− Tjtpj(n))
noting that only a of Tjt’s equal 1. Substituting this into (20) using (11), as
Pτ
t=1 nt =
I,
mU (I,L,w; a) = E
⎡
⎣
τX
t=1
nt
⎧
⎨
⎩1−
JY
j=1
(1− Tjtpj(n))
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎤
⎦
= I (1−Ψ(I,L,w; a))
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Next consider distinct wages. Note that for any series Xk, using Xj = 1− (1−Xj),
JX
j=1
j−1Y
k=1
(1−Xk)Xj =
JX
j=1
j−1Y
k=1
(1−Xk)−
JX
j=1
jY
k=1
(1−Xk)
=
JX
j=1
j−1Y
k=1
(1−Xk)−
J+1X
j=2
j−1Y
k=1
(1−Xk)
= 1−
JY
k=1
(1−Xk)
Then by substituting in (15) and (16) into (20) and using the above,
mD(I,L,w; a) =
JX
j=1
E
⎡
⎣
τX
t=1
j−1Y
k=1
(1− Tktpk(n))Tjt
JX
j=1
pj(n)
⎤
⎦
= E
"
τX
t=1
nt
(
1−
JY
k=1
(1− Tktpk(n))
)#
which again equals (21).
Therefore the aggregate matching function is the same irrespective of the wage
policies of the firms. What diﬀer are the actual values of m(I,L,w; a), due to the
diﬀerent equilibrium application strategies θ chosen by the applicants to satisfy (7),
and the distribution of the matches at the firms given by (11) and (15).
Now of the family of matching functions, (21) is a most general one in that it allows
multiple-application workers and multiple-vacancies firms. As such many matching
functions in the literature are nested in this. For example both Albrecht et al. (2004)
and Hori (2007) consider workers with multiple applications but single-vacancy firms.
I have already stated in (18) that with uniform L the workers choose all types with
identical probabilities 1τ , and thus applying this to (8) and substituting into (22),
Ψ(I, J ; a) =
X
n∈Λ
I!Qτ
t=1 nt!
1
τ I
τX
t=1
nt
I
JY
j=1
(1− Tjtpj(n))
=
X
n∈Λ
1
τ I−1
(I − 1)!
(n1 − 1)!
Qτ
t=2 nt!
aY
j=1
(1− pj(n)) (23)
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where pj(n) = 1αj(n) if αj(n) > 0, and 0 otherwise. The second line is derived by using
symmetry and selecting type 1 that applies to the first a jobs as the representative
applicant. This applied to (21) is the matching function derived in Hori (2007). Hori
further demonstrates that in taking the limit I, J →∞ and JI → μ <∞, (23) yields
the same limiting result as that derived by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2003),
Ψ(I, J ; a) =
n
1− μ
a
³
1− e−
a
μ
´oa
(24)
More traditional forms of matching functions are derived in an urn-ball set-up,
where workers apply to one firm only, and firms oﬀer a single vacancy and randomly
select one candidate (see for example in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). This is
the case where a = 1 and Lj = 1 ∀j, which when applied to (23) yields,
Ψ(I, J ; 1) =
IX
n1=1
µ
I − 1
n1 − 1
¶µ
1
J
¶n1−1µ
1− 1
J
¶I−n1 µ
1− 1
n1
¶
= 1− J
I
(
1−
µ
1− 1
J
¶I)
and therefore,
m(I, J ; 1) = J
(
1−
µ
1− 1
J
¶I)
(25)
This is equivalent to the matching function derived in Pissarides (1979). Petrongolo
and Pissarides further state that for large J this becomes
m(I, J ; 1) = J
³
1− e− IJ
´
(26)
which is simply (21) using (24) when a = 1.8 As noted by Albrecht et al. (2006),
these functions capture the urn-ball friction of the job-matching market, i.e. the
coordination failure that results in some vacancies receiving no application, while
others receive more than one. Julien et al. (2000) on the other hand envisage a case
8Blanchard and Diamond (1994) also uses this limiting form of matching function, with an addi-
tional exogenous parameter in the exponent representing the acceptable application probability.
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where firms choose one applicant to make one job oﬀer, and workers with multiple
oﬀers auction their employment. In the derived model this is the case Lj = 1 ∀j and
a = J , i.e. workers in eﬀect apply to all firms. Then as there is only one type of
applicant with n1 = I, (23) becomes,
Ψ(I,1,w;J) =
µ
1− 1
I
¶J
and hence
m(I,1,w;J) = I
(
1−
µ
1− 1
I
¶J)
which is the matching function derived by Julian et al. In the Albrecht et al.’s
classification this captures the multiple-applications friction, i.e. the coordination
failure that results in some workers receiving multiple oﬀers, while others receive
none. The matching function derived here encapsulates both of these job-matching
market frictions.
5 Conclusions
Three main results are attained in this paper. First in contrast to the undirected-
search models, the application process of workers with preferences for a higher wage
is formally modelled, and the equilibrium application strategy for the wage-directed
search is derived. Second in applying this to the homogenous-workers labour market,
it is shown that the equilibrium outcome cannot be uniform-wage when firms have
non-uniform labour demands. Finally a matching function is derived that capture
both urn-ball and multiple-applications frictions, which nests many of the derived
matching functions in the literature.
There are many possible future extensions for the model. First, it is argued here
that by eliminating the possibility of a uniform-wage equilibrium, the equilibrium
outcome must exhibit wage dispersion. A formal analysis of the existence or the
uniqueness of the equilibria may be one possible future analysis (see for example
Galenianos and Kircher (2007) for the existence of their wage dispersion equilibrium).
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Secondly I note that for uniform labour demand, the equilibrium wage policy can be
either uniform or non-uniform. For example with the example considered in Section
3.4, if Lj = 1 ∀j then the uniform wage wj = 0.92 and the distinct wages w =
(1.0, 0.91, 0.79)0 both lead to uniform expected profits Eπj = 0.246 for all firms when
y = 1.25. The results so far do not predict which equilibrium should be chosen.
This raises a further question of whether, other things being equal, it is also in the
interest of the firms to vary their labour demands. Indeed as well as frictional wage
dispersion, there may be an eﬀect of the labour market friction on firms’ determination
of labour demands. Third possible extension is to introduce heterogeneity in jobs and
workers. The optimal job application strategy derived in Section 2 does not make
any restrictions on the probabilities of job oﬀers pij , and thus this can be applied
to cases where workers’ skills match to the oﬀered jobs aﬀect the probabilities. An
extension of this may then lead to a matching model that captures both the job-
matching market frictions caused by coordination failure and heterogeneity, along the
line of Hori (2005). Finally the paper does not consider eﬃciency issues. Albrecht
et al. (2006) state that when both urn-ball and multiple-applications frictions are
present, the equilibrium outcome is ineﬃcient as the market cannot correct both of
the frictions at the same time. If it is the case that firms have two tools - the wage level
and the labour demand as suggested above, then this may lead to an improvement in
eﬃciency.
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A Supplement to Proof of Proposition 3
The supplementary proof requires the following rule,
Definition 3 (Replacement Rule) Consider the case where Bn ⊂ AN but bn+1 /∈
AN , where n < N . Then define the following rule that replaces one element of AN |Bn
with bn+1,
1. If ∃r ∈ AN such that r /∈ Bn and r > bn+1, then replace the smallest such (i.e.
the largest wr) element.
2. Else replace the largest element (i.e. one with the smallest wr) such that r /∈ Bn
and r < bn+1.
For example, given bn+1 /∈ AN , if the smallest element in AN such that r > bn+1
was one of {b1, b2, ..., bn}, then the rule will continue to look for the next smallest non-
NBC element on the right-hand side. If no such element is found (i.e. all elements
on the right of bn+1 in AN is a member of Bn), then the rule will look for the largest
non-NBC on the left-hand side of bn+1. Using this,
Supplementary Proof to Proposition 3 . I prove that given a set A∗N
containing the n first NBCs Bn, n < N , but not bn+1, replacing r ∈ A∗N |Bn with
bn+1 to form A0N using the above Replacement Rule results in a higher expected wage
income, and hence A∗N cannot be the Ew-max set of {AN}. I consider the two cases
where bn+1 is smaller or greater than r:
1. bn+1 < r. Note that there may or may not be one or more NBCs bj ∈ Bn such
that bn+1 < bj < r. Denote the range of such bj ’s, if they exist, by [b, b]. Then as
bn+1 was not chosen for A∗N , we know from Proposition 1 that wbn+1 > wb ≥ wr.
Now the expected wage income of A∗N and A
0
N can be expanded as,
Ew(A∗N ) = Ew(A
∗<b
N ) + s(A
∗<b
N )Ew(A
∗[b,r]
N ) + s(A
∗≤r
N )Ew(A
∗>r
N )
Ew(A0N ) = Ew(A
0<bn+1
N ) + s(A
0<bn+1
N )Ew(A
0[bn+1,b]
N ) + s(A
0≤b
N )Ew(A
0>b
N )
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As A∗<bN = A
0<bn+1
N and A
∗>r
N = A
0>b
N , and noting that A
∗[b,r]
N = B
[b,b]
n ∪ {r} and
A0[bn+1,b]N = B
[bn+1,b]
n+1 , then,
Ew(A0N)−Ew(A∗N) = s(A
0<bn+1
N )
h
Ew(B[bn+1,b]n+1 )−Ew(B[b,b]n ∪ {r})
i
−(pbn+1 − pr)s(A
∗≤b
N )Ew(A
0>b
N ) (27)
If [b, b] is an empty set, then b and b in these equations are replaced by r and
bn+1 respectively. In analogy to the proof for Proposition 2, the sign of (27)
now needs to be checked for each of the three cases pbn+1 <,=, > pr. First
consider the case pbn+1 < pr. Whilst the sign of Ew(B
[bn+1,b]
n+1 )−Ew(B
[b,b]
n ∪{r})
is uncertain, we do know that Ew(Bn+1) > Ew(Bn ∪ {r}) by the definition of
NBC and the fact that an applicant will always choose the left-most job given
two or more equally preferred choices. Expanding these,
Ew(Bn ∪ {r}) = Ew(B<bn ) + s(B<bn )Ew(B[b,b]n ∪ {r}) + s(B≤bn )(1− pr)Ew(B>bn )
Ew(Bn+1) = Ew(B
<bn+1
n+1 ) + s(B
<bn+1
n+1 )Ew(B
[bn+1,b]
n+1 ) + s(B
≤b
n+1)Ew(B
>b
n+1)
Noting that B<bn = B
<bn+1
n+1 and B
>b
n = B
>b
n+1 then, using these (27) becomes,
Ew(A0N )−Ew(A∗N) =
s(A0<bn+1N )
s(B<bn+1n+1 )
[Ew(Bn+1)−Ew(Bn ∪ {r})] (28)
−(pbn+1 − pr)s(A
∗≤b
N )
h
Ew(A0>bN )−Ew(B>bn+1)
i
Further B>bn+1 ⊆ A0>bN implies that Ew(A0>bN ) ≥ Ew(B>bn+1). Thus for pbn+1 < pr,
(28) is strictly positive. This is true also for the case pbn+1 = pr. For pbn+1 > pr,
I use the equality
P
k∈[b,b] s(B
[b,k)
n )pk = 1 − s(B[b,b]n ), i.e. the probability of
getting at least one job oﬀer within [b, b] is 1 minus the probability of receiving
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no job oﬀer. Then expanding the [ ] term on the right-hand side of (27),
Ew(B[bn+1,b]n+1 )−Ew(B[b,b]n ∪ {r})
= pbn+1wbn+1 + (1− pbn+1)Ew(B[b,b]n )−Ew(B[b,b]n )− s(B[b,b]n )prwr
= pbn+1
⎧
⎨
⎩wbn+1 −
X
k∈[b,b]
s(B[b,k)n )pkwk
⎫
⎬
⎭− s(B
[b,b]
n )prwr
> pbn+1
⎧
⎨
⎩1−
X
k∈[b,b]
s(B[b,k)n )pk
⎫
⎬
⎭wbn+1 − s(B
[b,b]
n )prwbn+1
= s(B[b,b]n )
¡
pbn+1 − pr
¢
wbn+1
The inequality uses wbn+1 > wb ≥ wr. Substituting this back into (27) yields,
Ew(A0N )−Ew(A∗N ) > (pbn+1 − pr)s(A
∗≤b
N )
n
wbn+1 −Ew(A0>bN )
o
As we know from Property 1 that Ew(A0>bN ) < wbn+1 , this implies thatEw(A
0
N ) >
Ew(A∗N ) also for pbn+1 > pr. Therefore in all cases Ew(A
0
N ) > Ew(A
∗
N ).
2. bn+1 > r. Again there may or may not be one or more NBCs bj ∈ [b, b] ⊂ Bn
between bn+1 and r, such that r < [b, b] < bn+1. Now the fact that there
are no non-NBCs on the right-hand side of bn+1 means that A∗>rN = B
≥b
n and
A0≥bN = B
≥b
n+1. Then this time,
Ew(A∗N) = Ew(A
∗<r
N ) + s(A
∗<r
N )Ew({r} ∪B≥bn )
Ew(A0N) = Ew(A
0<b
N ) + s(A
0<b
N )Ew(B
≥b
n+1)
Ew(A0N)−Ew(A∗N) = s(A
0<b
N )
h
Ew(B≥bn+1)−Ew({r} ∪B≥bn )
i
(29)
using A∗<rN = A
0<b
N . Now again we know that Ew(Bn+1) > Ew(Bn∪{r}), which
is strictly true this time from the definition of bn+1 for any r on the left-hand
30
side of bn+1. When expanded these are,
Ew(Bn ∪ {r}) = Ew(B<bn ) + s(B<bn )Ew({r} ∪B≥bn )
Ew(Bn+1) = Ew(B
<b
n+1) + s(B
<b
n+1)Ew(B
≥b
n+1)
Since B<bn = B
<b
n+1 then, by substitution (29) becomes,
Ew(A0N)−Ew(A∗N) =
s(A0<bN )
s(B<bn+1)
[Ew(Bn+1)−Ew(Bn ∪ {r})] > 0 (30)
Hence again Ew (A∗N) cannot be the Ew-max set of {AN}.
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